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Optimization of Network Robustness to Waves of Targeted and Random Attacks
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We study the robustness of complex networks to multiple waves of simultaneous (i) targeted
attacks in which the highest degree nodes are removed and (ii) random attacks (or failures) in which
fractions pt and pr respectively of the nodes are removed until the network collapses. We find that
the network design which optimizes network robustness has a bimodal degree distribution, with a
fraction r of the nodes having degree k2 = (〈k〉 − 1 + r)/r and the remainder of the nodes having
degree k1 = 1, where 〈k〉 is the average degree of all the nodes. We find that the optimal value of r
is of the order of pt/pr for pt/pr ≪ 1.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Hh, 02.50.Cw, 64.60.Ak
Recently, there has been much interest in the resilience
of real-world networks to random attacks or to attacks
targeted on the highest degree nodes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8].
Many real-world networks are robust to random attacks
but vulnerable to targeted attacks. It is important to
understand how to design networks which are optimally
robust against both types of attacks, with examples be-
ing terrorist attacks on physical networks and attacks by
hackers on computer networks. Studies to date [7, 8] have
considered only the case in which there was only one type
of attack on a given network — that is, the network was
subject to either a random attack or to a targeted attack
but not subject to different types of attack simultane-
ously.
A more realistic scenario is one in which a network is
subjected to simultaneous targeted and random attacks.
This scenario can be modeled as a sequence of “waves”
of targeted and random attacks which remove fractions
pt and pr of the original nodes, respectively. The ratio
pt/pr is kept constant while the individual fractions pt
and pr approach zero. After some time (after m waves of
random and targeted attacks) the network will become
disconnected; at this point a fraction fc = m(pt + pr) of
the nodes have been removed. This fc characterizes the
network robustness. The larger fc, the more robust the
network is. We propose in this Letter a mathematical
approach to study such simultaneous attacks and find
the optimal network design one which maximizes fc In
our optimization analysis, we compare the robustness of
networks which have the same “cost” of construction and
maintenance, where we define cost to be proportional to
the average degree 〈k〉 of all the nodes in the network.
We study mainly two types of random networks:
(i) Scale-free networks. Many real world computer, so-
cial, biological and other types of networks have
been found to be scale free, i.e., they exhibit degree
distributions of the form P (k) ∼ k−λ [9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. For large scale-free networks
with exponent λ less than 3, for random attacks es-
sentially all nodes must be removed for the network
to become disconnected [3, 4]. On the other hand,
because the scale free distribution has a long power-
law tail (i.e. hubs with large degree), the scale-free
networks are very vulnerable with respect to tar-
geted attack.
(ii) Networks with bimodal degree distributions. For re-
silience to single random or single targeted attacks,
certain bimodal distributions are superior to any
other network [7, 8]. Here we ask if these networks
are also most resilient to multiple waves of both
random and targeted attacks.
We present the following argument that suggests that
the degree distribution which optimizes fc is a bimodal
distribution in which a fraction r of the nodes has degree
k2 =
〈k〉 − 1 + r
r
(1)
and the remainder has degree k1 = 1 and we show that
r is of the order of pt/pr. To optimize against random
removal, we maximize the quantity κ ≡ 〈k2〉/〈k〉, since
for random removal the threshold is [3]
f randc = 1−
1
κ− 1
. (2)
Since we keep 〈k〉 fixed, κ is just the variance of the de-
gree distribution and is maximized for a bimodal distri-
bution in which the lower degree nodes have the smallest
possible degree k1 = 1 and the higher degree nodes have
the highest possible degree consistent with keeping 〈k〉
fixed, k2 = (〈k〉 − 1 + r)/r. Thus, k2 is maximized when
r assumes its smallest possible value, r = 1/N . On the
other hand, if all of the high degree nodes are removed
by targeted attacks, the network will be very vulnerable
to random attack. So we want to delay as long as pos-
sible the situation in which all of the high degree nodes
2are removed by targeted attacks—which argues for not
choosing r as small as possible but choosing r such that
some high connectivity nodes remain as long as there
are some low connectivity nodes. Such a condition is
achieved when r is of the order of pt/pr.
FIG. 1: (a) The threshold fc of three bimodal networks with
〈k〉 = 3, with (i) r = 2× 10−3 and k2 = 200, (ii) r = 5× 10
−3
and k2 = 90, and (iii) r = 10
−2 and k2 = 50. The results are
plotted as a function of the ratio pt/pr for three fixed values
of pr. These plots show that the values of the threshold are
dependent only on the ratio pt/pr and independent of the
value of pr itself. (b) Scaled plot of the data in (a). The data
show that the plots collapse in the region where r/ (pt/pr) .
1.
The method we employ for determining the threshold
makes use of the following: the general condition for a
random network to be globally connected is [3, 5, 6]
κ =
〈k2〉
〈k〉
≥ 2. (3)
Random removal of a fraction pr of nodes from a network
with degree distribution P0(k) results in a new degree
distribution [3]
P (k) =
K∑
k0=k
P0(k)
(
k0
k
)
(1− pr)
k pk0−kr , (4)
where K is the upper cutoff of the degree distribution.
Targeted removal of a fraction pt of the highest degree
nodes reduces the value of upper cutoff K to K˜, which
is implicitly determined by the equation
pt =
K∑
k=K˜
P0(k). (5)
The removal of high degree nodes causes another effect.
Since the links that lead to removed nodes are elimi-
nated, the degree distribution also changes. This effect
is equivalent to the random removal of a fraction of p˜
nodes where
p˜ =
∑K
k=K˜ kP0(k)
〈k〉0
. (6)
The average 〈k〉0 is taken over the degree distribution
before the removal of nodes [5]. Equation (4) with pr re-
placed by p˜ can then be used to calculate the effect of the
link removal. Starting with a certain initial degree distri-
bution, we recursively calculate P (k) alternating between
random and targeted attack using Eqs. (4), (5), and (6),
and calculate κ after each wave of attacks. When κ < 2
global connectivity is lost and fc = m(pr + pt) where m
is the number of waves of attacks performed.
We begin our study by first establishing numerically
that, for small values of pt, pr and pt/pr, the thresh-
old fc depends only on pt/pr. In Fig. 1(a), we plot the
threshold fc of a network with a bimodal degree distri-
bution with 〈k〉 = 3 for various values of pr and r as
a function of the ratio pt/pr. The collapse of the plots
with the same r but different pr shows that the values of
threshold are essentially independent of the value of pr
itself but depend only on the ratio pt/pr [23].
In Fig. 1(b) we plot fc against the scaled variable
r/(pt/pr). We see that the plots for different values
of r collapse, indicating that only the scaled variable
r/(pt/pr) is relevant [24].
Next we study the dependence of fc on k2. As seen in
Fig. 2, as expected the maximum values of fc for various
values of pt/pr are obtained when k2 is maximum (i.e.,
when k1 = 1, see Eq. (1).).
We are now in a position to determine the value of r
which optimizes fc, ropt. In Fig. 3, we plot fc as a func-
tion of the scaled parameter r/(pt/pr) with k2 set to the
maximum value possible for each value of r. We note that
there is a transition at a well-defined value of r/(pt/pr)
at which fc increases rapidly to a shallow maximum f
opt
c
at ropt/(pt/pr) ≈ 1.7. This value of ropt/(pt/pr) is valid
for pt/pr ≪ 1. In order to determine ropt/(pt/pr) over
a wider range, we make extensive numerical calculations
for 10−3 < pt/pr < 0.1. For each value of pt/pr, we cal-
culate the value ropt/(pt/pr) where fc takes its maximum
value and find
ropt
pt/pr
≈ 1.7− 5.6
(
pt
pr
)
+O
(
pt
pr
)2
(7)
3FIG. 2: The threshold fc versus k2 for a bimodal network with
〈k〉 = 3 and r = 10−2 for three values of pt/pr. The value of pr
is fixed at 0.02. For each value of pt/pr, the thresholds take
their maximum values at the maximum k2 (obtained when
k1 = 1).
FIG. 3: The threshold fc versus the scaled parameter
r/(pt/pr) for a bimodal network with 〈k〉 = 3 and k2 maxi-
mum (i.e., k1 = 1).
within the range of our calculation. For larger values of
pt/pr, ropt = 1 and from Eq. (1) all nodes have degree
〈k〉. In Fig. 4, we plot the values of the optimal threshold
foptc by a thick solid curve.
In Fig. 4 we also plot the values of the threshold fc for
the same bimodal network but we fix r independent of
pt/pr. We see that these configurations are not signifi-
cantly less robust than the optimal configuration. Thus,
even if we do not know the ratio pt/pr exactly we can
design networks which will be relatively robust. For ex-
ample, the bimodal network with r = 0.03 is relatively
robust for pt/pr . 0.1 and the bimodal network with
r = 0.09 is robust for pt/pr . 1. Also plotted in Fig. 4
is the optimal scale-free network with 〈k〉 = 3. We see
that the optimal bimodal network is more robust than
the optimal scale-free network and we can even pick a
FIG. 4: The threshold fc versus pt/pr. The topmost (thick-
est) curve is for a bimodal network with 〈k〉 = 3 with
k1 = 1 and with r optimized by Eq. (7) for each value
of pt/pr. The values of the threshold for the same bi-
modal network with k1 = 1 when we fix r independent
of pt/pr are plotted in thin curves. The values of r are
r = 0.001, 0.002, 0.005, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.07, 0.09, 0.11, 0.13,
and 0.15, from left to right. The curve marked with crossed
circles (⊕) is a plot of the threshold values for a scale-free net-
work with 〈k〉 = 3, N = 104, and with exponent chosen for
each pt/pr to optimize the threshold. Note that the thresh-
olds for bimodal networks with 0.03 . r . 0.09 are always
more robust than the optimized scale-free network.
configuration with fixed r (e.g. r = 0.03) which is more
robust than the optimal scale-free network in most ranges
of pt/pr.
FIG. 5: Realization of bimodal network with N = 100 nodes,
〈k〉 = 2.1 and r = 0.1, so there are rN = 10 “hub” nodes of
degree 12, as found from Eq. (1).
In Fig. 5 we show a typical optimal realization of a
bimodal network. The network of N = 100 nodes con-
sists of rN nodes with k = k2 (“hubs”) which are highly
connected among themselves; the nodes of single degree
are each connected to one of these hubs. We note that
4while the hubs are highly connected among themselves,
they do not form a complete graph — every hub is not
connected to every other hub. For larger N , the fraction
of hubs to which a given hub connects decreases but the
robustness of the network is unchanged.
In summary, we have provided a qualitative argument
and numerical results which indicate that the most ro-
bust network to multiple waves of targeted and random
attacks has a bimodal degree distribution with a fraction
r of the nodes having degree k2 = (〈k〉 − 1 + r)/r and
the remainder of the nodes having degree 1. The opti-
mal value of r is approximately 1.7 (pt/pr) for pt/pr ≪ 1.
For larger values of pt/pr, the optimal value of r is 1 and
all nodes have degree 〈k〉. Even if pt/pr is not known
exactly, a value of r can be chosen which maximizes the
network robustness over a wide range of values of pt/pr,
as seen in Fig. 4.
We note that while the optimal distribution found here
and that found in Ref. [8] are both bimodal, the values of
the parameters characterizing these distributions are dif-
ferent. As found in Ref. [8] the network with optimal re-
silience to either random or targeted attack has r = 1/N
and k2 ∼ r
−2/3. Finally, we note that it is possible to
prove analytically that for the case in which a single tar-
geted attack followed by a single random attack results
in the network becoming disconnected, the optimal dis-
tribution is also bimodal with k1 = 1, k2 = (〈k〉−1+r)/r
and r of the order of pt/pr [25] — supporting the results
found here for multiple waves of attacks.
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